







Africa is caught between the birth of her modern nationalism
and the quest for nationhood. Her nationalism is a reality that
played a part in ending territorial colonialism but nationhood
itself is an ambition rather than a reality. The agonies of Africa
in the second half of the twentieth century have been ultimately
derived from the pains of intermediacy between nationalism
and nationhood.
We shall discuss in this article the rise of the new political
consciousness in Africa, its potential, and its limitations. We
shall also examine the fortunes of political parties in the
continent across that historic divide between colonialism and
formal independence. We shall grapple with the emergence of
new social classes in Africa, and the impact of civil-military
relations on this system of stratification.
THE EMERGENCE OF PAN-AFRICANISM
A basic dialectic to understand in Africa is that while the
greatest friend of African nationalism is race-consciousness,
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the greatest enemy of African nationhood is ethnic-conscious-
ness. Modem African nationalism was born and prospered
under the stimulation of racial solidarity and shared blackness.
On the other hand, the struggle for viable modern nations
within Africa is considerably hampered by acute ethnic
cleavages, often separating Bantu from Nilotes, Ibo from
Hausa, and the like. We shall examine this fundamental
dialectic, since it is precisely this which has made the transition
from African nationalism to African nationhood so painful
and demanding.
The discovery of shared blackness under the pressure of
colonial control resulted in part in the emergence of pan-
Africanism. Here we must distinguish between sub-Saharan
pan-Africanism, meaning the solidarity of black people within
the African continent south of the Sahara, and trans-Saharan
pan-Africanism, encompassing not only the Africans south of
the great continental desert, but also the Arabs in the northern
section of the continent. There is also transatlantic pan-
Africanism, which is the solidarity between the peoples of the
African continent and the Black Diaspora in the Caribbean
and American continents.
Historically one would have expected pan-Africanism to
start from the smaller units of the subcontinent south of the
Sahara, and then move outwards to encompass North Africa,
and then ultimately reestablish contact with the Black Dias-
pora. But it is arguable that, in the twentieth century at any
rate, pan-Africanism started with the transatlantic version
before it focused more narrowly on the African continent itself.
And in the birth of transatlantic pan-Africanism the Black
Diaspora was critical. It might even be argued that the
movement started with alienated black nationalists in the
Caribbean and North America, sometimes eager to start the
process of a black return to the African continent, while at
other times merely emphasizing the need for black liberation
both in Africa and the Americas. We know that the founding
fathers of transatlantic pan-Africanism include black Ameri-
cans like W.E.B. DuBois and West Indians like George
Padmore and Marcus Garvey.
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Partly as a result of initiatives by black nationalists in the
Diaspora, sub-Saharan pan-Africanism also began to gather
momentum. Black Africans in West Africa began to feel a
greater bond with each other, and to discover more fully the
shared predicament of black Africans elsewhere within the
continent. As the twentieth century unfolded, East Africans
gradually learned that there were countries called Nigeria and
the Gold Coast with black people in situations similar to their
own. West Africans in turn discovered the existence of a
Kenya, Uganda, or Nyasaland.
Transatlantic pan-Africanism developed as a movement of
ideas and emotions, with little institutionalization apart from
periodic conferences without a standing secretariat. Sub-
Saharan pan-Africanism was even less institutionalized on the
scale of the subcontinent, though it did influence the formation
of smaller subregional economic and functional communities
like the East African Community and OCAM.
Although race-consciousness was the original fountain of
pan-Africanism, it was neither the transatlantic movement nor
the sub-Saharan movement that found institutional fulfillment
at first. It was in fact trans-Saharan pan-Africanism, in spite of
the significant racial differences separating parts of North
Africa from parts of Africa south of the Sahara. The begin-
nings of pan-African solidarity at the institutional level
provided a foundation for joint action in some spheres between
Arabs and black Africans. The Organization of African Unity
was finally formed in 1963, encompassing states across both
sides of the great continental desert, and providing a frame-
work for periodic meetings of African Heads of States and
Government.
The older transatlantic movement continued at the level of
emotions and ideas of unity without an institutional frame-
work. Yet another transatlantic pan-African congress was
scheduled to take place in Dar es Salaam in June 1974-the
Sixth Pan-African Congress, separated from the Fifth Pan-
African Congress held in Manchester, England by nearly thirty
years. The Fifth Pan-African Congress took place in 1945, and
among the relatively unknown participants at that Congress
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was a young man called Kwame Nkrumah and a more mature,
but still relatively obscure man called Jomo Kenyatta.
Nearly thirty years later in the capital of independent
Tanzania an additional Congress in that transatlantic move-
ment was at last inaugurated. Transatlantic pan-Africanism
has so far found greater articulation in the cultural domain
than in the political. The festivals of black pan-African art,
held in places ranging from Paris to Lagos, Dakar to Algiers,
have provided greater demonstration of transatlantic fervor
than some of the political congresses within the same move-
ment.
As regards sub-Saharan pan-Africanism, its strongest sup-
porters have been among the less radical and more conserva-
tive African nationalists in the modern period. It has been
preeminently those with strong reservations about the Arabs
who have championed platforms of solidarity limiting them-
selves to the black part of the continent. Voices, which over
the decades have sometimes championed this brand of pan-
Africanism, have included Chief Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria
in the 1950s and early 1960s, Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi in
a fluctuating manner, and President Felix Houphouet-Boigny
of Ivory Coast in at least some of his moods.
The more radical black African leaders in the modern phase
have preferred trans-Saharan pan-Africanism, insisting on
ignoring the desert as a divide, preferring instead to use the
continent as a whole as the unit of solidarity.
Trans-Saharan pan-Africanism was not only a matter of
foreign policy but sometimes included significant domestic
consequences. For a number of generations black nationalists
both within the continent and in the Diaspora took pride in old
civilizations of Africa-the ancient civilizations of Egypt and
the historic civilization of Ethiopia. Cultural nationalism
among otherwise humiliated African intellectuals found a
moment of pride in contemplating the achievements of pharao-
nic Egypt and the uninterrupted history of Ethiopia as a
sovereign African nation.
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But for quite a while neither modern Egypt nor Ethiopia
reciprocated this identification with black nationalists. The
black nationalists moved forward to embrace the memories of
Egyptian and Ethiopian achievements, but modern Egyptians
maintained their political and cultural distance from the rest of
Africa.
And then, in the second half of the twentieth century, two
individuals began the process of restoring the balance of
identification. One of these individuals was an Egyptian
soldier, who reminded his countrymen that they were Africans
as well as Arabs and Muslims. The other individual was an
Ethiopian Emperor, who reminded his countrymen that they
were part of an African reality as well as of an Ethiopian
history. Gamal Abdel Nasser began the process of re-African-
izing Egypt while Haile Sellassie I inaugurated the re-Africani-
zation of Ethiopia.
Yet for a while it was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who
became the most eloquent voice of both trans-Saharan and
transatlantic pan-Africanism. Nkrumah captured important
longings and emotions prevalent at a given moment in history
across much of the African continent and the Black Diaspora,
and he managed to give these emotions and aspirations per-
suasive articulation.
Before long Accra became the capital of the principle of pan-
Africanism, at least until May 1963 when Addis Ababa became
the capital of the practice of pan-Africanism.
But now a further distinction has to be made between pan-
Africanism as a movement of liberation and pan-Africanism as
a movement of integration. Pan-Africanism as a liberating
force had greater success than as an integrative quest. The
liberation movement has concerned itself with putting pressure
in favor of decolonization, and lobbying for the isolation of the
white minority regimes of southern Africa. Joint action at the
United Nations in pursuit of African independence was
remarkably successful from the moment of Ghana’s indepen-
dence in 1957 until the moment of Ian Smith’s Unilateral
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Declaration of Independence (UDI) for Rhodesia in Novem-
ber 1965. The eight years separating Ghana’s independence
and Rhodesia’s UDI were momentous for African decoloniza-
tion, and African states, though sometimes divided bitterly on
tactics and even strategies, were able nevertheless to maintain a
viable spirit of solidarity in pursuit of decolonization. From
1965 onwards the frustrations of the remaining areas under
white control began to mount as African states felt relatively
helpless in determining the fates of Rhodesia, Namibia, South
Africa, and the countries under Portuguese rule.
Nevertheless, even in this period of mounting frustrations,
there was also an undercurrent of achievement for pan-
Africanism. The solidarity of African states made it difficult
for Britain to ease sanctions against Rhodesia, contributed to
the emergence of Guinea-Bissau as a partially independent
country, strengthened the activities of liberation movements in
Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories, and increased the
trend towards the diplomatic isolation of South Africa in
world politics.
Pan-Africanism as a movement for greater political and
economic integration, on the other hand, has had a much less
impressive record. Even those countries that started with a
substantial level of regional integration later experienced acute
tensions, and the level of integration declined.
The East African Community, consisting of Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania, is one case in point. In June 1963 hopes were
high that these three countries would soon evolve into a full
federation under one government. But that mood of political
optimism, even of euphoria, did not last long. Tensions began
to be felt, and one after another the services and links among
the three countries were either loosened or ended altogether.
Movement of goods among them ceased to be free, movement
of people among them became more strictly controlled, a
shared currency came to an end, a shared system of internal
revenue was dismantled, a joint university existing parallel to
but not within the East African Community broke up into
three separate universities, and moments of actual military
confrontation were experienced.
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French-speaking Africa also witnessed fluctuating fortunes
in its quest for greater integration. Organizational and func-
tional experiments had their ups and downs. Countries would
join an economic community only to withdraw two years later;
services would be made subject to regional control only to be
dismantled into national units not long afterwards.
Nigeria in 1964 began to move with a greater determination
toward creating a more viable West African Economic Com-
munity, independent of the linguistic barriers inherited from
the colonial past. But the struggle to get West Africans to
transcend the cultural and linguistic differences inherited from
Britain and France was an undertaking too big to be accom-
plished very rapidly. Nigeria’s efforts in this direction were in
conflict with attempts within French-speaking Africa. Most of
the French-speaking African states seemed for a while to be in
favor of creating a community of their own, to which English-
speaking states could later accede. Nigeria argued, on the other
hand, that there was a fundamental difference between joining
a community which had already been formed by others, and
participating in defining what the community should be from
the outset. Nigeria was pleading for joint participation in the
very founding of such a community on a basis that disregarded
the anglophone-francophone divide.
On balance the tensions continued within integrative move-
ments of this kind all over the continent, both north and south
of the Sahara. That spirit of solidarity which could be
mobilized into relative effectiveness in the domain of African
liberation often proved inadequate in the domain of African
integration. All was not lost by any means, but the struggle for
greater cohesiveness promised to be hard and long.
THE MILITARY FACTOR IN
AFRICAN LIBERATION
But problems of integration were even more fundamental at
the national than the regional level. If, as we indicated, race
consciousness had been a powerful aid to the whole movement
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of Pan-Africanism, ethnic consciousness has militated against
national integration within individual African countries.
Partly as a result of this problem, there has been an interplay
between civilian politics and military rule in Africa’s indepen-
dent experience. Later we shall return more fully to this
dialectic between soldiers and politicians, but we might begin
first with an examination of the role of the military factor in
African liberation before we examine it in relation to African
integration.
A phenomenon which now needs to be examined in the wake
of the military coup in Portugal and its aftermath is, quite
simply, the impact of a military coup in the European
metropolitan country on the prospects of African liberation.
We have witnessed a pattern concerning the significance of
metropolitan coups-a pattern with relevance for the libera-
tion not only of the former Portuguese colonies, but conceiv-
ably even of Zimbabwe and South Africa. Will the first signs of
a cracking political system within Rhodesia or South Africa be
a military challenge by the white military forces themselves
against civilian authority in Salisbury or Pretoria? Is it now
conceivable that the trend of events in southern Africa will be
in the direction, first, of increasing pressure from black
liberation forces, second, of frustrations among the so-called
security forces fighting on behalf of the regimes, and third, of
new strains on civil-military relations within the white regimes
themselves?
In recent African history the first major case of a metropoli-
tan coup leading to colonial liberation was in fact the military
situation in Algeria and France, which culminated in the
assumption of power by General Charles de Gaulle in 1958.
The French army had got increasingly frustrated as a result of
major setbacks, first in Indochina and later in Algeria. In the
earlier insurrection the French army had had to face the
humiliation of Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. The ultimate
capitulation of the French attempt to retain Indochina, and
French withdrawal from that region, stiffened for a while the
French determination to resist all claims for independence in
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Algeria. In other words, the very success of the Vietnamese
against the French was for a while an obstacle in the way of the
National Liberation Front in Algeria. A level of stubbornness
and obstinacy in the ranks of French soldiers, and within
successive French governments, prolonged the Algerian war of
independence.
In 1958 France herself was already weary of the war, and the
politicians had not moved much further towards finding an
adequate solution. The soldiers in the field of Algeria were
growing increasingly frustrated. Finally a revolt on the part of
the soldiers, challenging the very existence of the French
Fourth Republic, created a national crisis of considerable
proportion. There seemed to be only one man high enough in
stature in France, and acceptable enough to large numbers on
both sides of the confrontation, to be capable of averting a civil
war in France. Charles de Gaulle had his second moment in
history. He emerged from the self-imposed oblivion which had
lasted since his resignation as head of government in 1946, and
assumed once again supreme authority in France.
The military challenge within the colonial power which had
resulted in the collapse of the Fourth Republic had immense
consequences for the French colonies at large, and not merely
for Algeria.
At first it looked as if De Gaulle’s strategy was really to
reaffirm and consolidate the links between the colonies and
Paris, rather than to facilitate the severance of those links. De
Gaulle’s idea of a referendum throughout the French empire
later in 1958 created the possibility of colonialism by consent.
One after another of the French colonies voted against
independence in favor of the continuing colonial association
with France. Only Guinea under Sekou Toure voted in favor of
breaking the colonial umbilical cord. De Gaulle reacted by
severing all links with Guinea, and pulling out of Guinea lock,
stock, and barrel. At first it looked as if the cause of African
independence in the French-dominated areas of the continent
had encountered a severe setback. But in fact, in little more
than one year, discussions were under way for the indepen-
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dence of all other French colonies, but within the so-called
French community. De Gaulle had decided that French
hegemony in Africa could be protected by alternative ways.
Direct colonial annexation was deemed to be no longer
necessary.
In Algeria itself the war continued, but before long it looked
as if De Gaulle was out to ensure a gradual disengagement by
metropolitan France from the Algerian mess. From the slogan
&dquo;Algeria is French,&dquo; De Gaulle gradually moved to the slogan
&dquo;Algeria is Algerian.&dquo; Explorations for a viable solution to the
crisis continued. De Gaulle began also to talk about &dquo;Peace for
the Brave,&dquo; implying a legitimacy for the liberation fighters
within Algeria. It took Charles de Gaulle about four years in all
to disengage France from the Algerian complications, and
permit an independent Algeria to emerge.
There was indeed a direct link between the struggle for the
liberation of Algeria and the fulfillment of political liberation
in the rest of French Africa.
Yet curiously, for a while much of French-speaking black
Africa tended to side with France against the National
Liberation Front on all debates concerning the future of
Algeria. Vote after vote in the United Nations from 1960
onward revealed a massive French-speaking black African
vote against the champions of Algerian independence. Only
Mali and Guinea seemed consistently sympathetic with the
National Liberation Front. While the issue of Algeria was itself
an important mechanism behind the liberation of all French
Africa, for a while debate and policy on that issue in French-
speaking Africa revealed a continuing colonial dependency.
But these were transient manifestations of that dependency,
especially since De Gaulle himself was on his way toward
finally making peace with the Algerian fighters.
What must always be remembered is precisely the simple
proposition that a metropolitan coup in Paris was a major
cause behind the acceleration of African liberation. What
ought also to be remembered is that the metropolitan coup
itself was substantially a response to a major military challenge
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from colonial liberation fighters. In this case the initial
challenge came from the Algerian insurrection under the
National Liberation Front, and the strains that these fighters
put on the French army finally snapped into a confrontation
between the French army and the French Fourth Republic,
leading to a collapse of that Republic, the rise of De Gaulle,
and the emergence of new possibilities for French colonies in
the African continent.
It took another decade and a half before history began to
repeat itself in another section of &dquo;Latin Africa&dquo; and its own
metropolitan power. This was the series of events that finally
led to a military coup in Portugal in 1974. Just as the Algerian
war of independence had been a fundamental precipitating
factor behind the rise of Charles de Gaulle in Paris in 1958, so
the Portuguese colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique, and
Guinea-Bissau were fundamental precipitating factors behind
the rise of Antonio de Spinola in Lisbon in 1974. France before
De Gaulle had insisted with obstinacy that Algeria was not a
colony but was part of France; Portugal before Spinola had
insisted that Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau were
not colonies but were integral provinces of metropolitan
Portugal. But just as De Gaulle said after his assumption of
power that Algeria was Algerian after all, Antonio de Spinola
argued before he assumed power in the following terms:
It is not national unity that is at stake but imperial unity, and
today’s conscience does not accept empires.... The future of
Portugal depends on an adequate solution to the war in which
we are involved [Spinola, 1974].1
In fact, Spinola-like De Gaulle before him-wrestled with
alternative solutions of integration between the overseas
provinces and the metropolitan countries in Europe. The idea
of a federal relationship did intrigue Charles de Gaulle at some
stage. A similar idea of federation between Portugal and her
colonies was central to Antonio de Spinola’s Portugal and the
Future. In both cases it was the continuing determination of
the freedom fighters in Africa that gradually tilted the balance
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of opinion in the imperial capitals. Postimperial Portugal is
still in the course of unfolding. The story of the future of
Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau after independence
is still inconclusive. What does emerge once again in the annals
of both Paris in 1958 and Lisbon in 1974 is indeed the impact of
metropolitan coups on prospects for African liberation.
In the case of Britain, it was not a coup that precipitated the
process of decolonization, but the combination of World War
II and a much smaller African colonial war in the 1950s. World
War II impoverished Britain and weakened her capacity to
maintain the largest empire in human history. In the face of a
rising political consciousness in colony after colony, and
against the background of a declining imperial will, the
momentous decision was taken to give independence to India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma. The most important military
factor behind the liberation of British Asia was no less a
phenomenon than a world war.
But the most important precipitating factor behind the
liberation of British Africa was the shock of the Mau Mau
insurrection in Kenya. The insurrection dramatized in a new
way the limits of peaceful imperial control in the wake of new
ambitions in the colonies. The insurrection also illustrated the
capacity of fighters with relatively rudimentary military tech-
nology to engage one of the mightiest of imperial powers for
several years without a clear convincing victory by the colonial
power. The Mau Mau insurrection also revealed the vulnera-
bility of white settlers in colonial situations in which they are
heavily outnumbered and yet insist on maintaining overall
domination.
With a major colonial war on her hands in East Africa, and
growing political militancy in West Africa, Britain undertook
an agonizing reappraisal of her presence in Africa. By 1957 the
first black colony in Africa emerged from British colonial
control. The independence of Ghana was a triumph not only
for the oratory of Nkrumah but also for the courage of
Kimathi, a victory not only for the organized effort of the
Convention People’s Party in Ghana but also for the armed
35
endeavor by the Mau Mau in Kenya, a fulfillment not only for
Africans in the streets of Accra but also for Africans in the
forests of the Aberdare Mountains. If World War II had
helped to break the British imperial will in Asia, the Mau Mau
insurrection had helped to break it in Africa. Military factors
once again played a part in African liberation, but in the case of
the collapse of the British imperial will it was not a military
coup in London but a couple of wars that proved decisive.
What remains for the future to reveal is precisely the extent
to which harassment by black nationalists in Zimbabwe might
gradually cause frustrations between the regime and armed
forces, and create tensions between the military establishment
in Rhodesia and the civilian political elite. What also remains
for the future to uncover is whether a similar scenario might
find realization in Pretoria.
CLASS, ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING
But military coups have by no means been a peculiarity of
white societies in control of black populations. At least as
dramatically, they have also been a feature of postcolonial
black Africa under the control of Africans.
The causes of military coups in independent black Africa
have been extensively analyzed and speculated upon. These
causes might be divided into three broad categories-intramili-
tary, societal, and extrasocietal.
Intramilitary explanations may be found in the attributes of
the military establishments themselves in African countries.
These would include a relative lack of discipline, a relatively
low level of professionalism, a relatively brief history of
combat and national commitment by the armed forces, and the
precise regional, ethnic, religious, and class composition of the
enlisted men compared to the officers.
Societal explanations of military coups are sought not in
issues such as the level of discipline or professionalism within
the armed forces, but in broader realities concerning society as
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a whole. Problems of general economic underdevelopment,
institutional fluidity, fragility of authority and weakness in
procedures, newness of statehood and in some cases newness of
nationhood-in short, problems of general underdevelopment
are much more pertinent factors behind military coups than
narrow intramilitary attributes.
The third category of causation is extrasocietal. In this case
the major precipitating factors are primarily external, rather
than peculiar either to the military establishment or to the
domestic arrangements of that society.
We might say that metropolitan coups of the kind that led to
the rise of De Gaulle and Spinola were coups whose ultimate
precipitating factor was extrasocietal, at least to the extent to
which the factor was colonial and thus outside the immediate
boundaries of the metropolitan countries in Europe. In reality,
if not by legal fiction, the Algerian war was extrasocietal, but it
deeply affected French society domestically. Even more clearly,
the wars in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau were
extrasocietal from Portugal’s point of view, in spite of the
decision by Portuguese governments to regard them as distur-
bances within the womb of Portugal itself.
Some military coups in independent black Africa have also
included extrasocietal factors among their causes. In at least
some cases it could be said that while coups within the imperial
powers like France and Portugal were partly caused by the
entanglement with their own colonies, the coups in some of the
former colonies have been partly caused by the continuing
entanglement with former colonial rulers. Just as imperial
factors played a part in the events of 1958 in Paris and the
events of 1974 in Lisbon, so imperial factors might have played
a part in the fall of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Milton Obote
in Uganda, Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (now Zaire), and
even the fall of Hamani Diori in Niger. An intermingling of
factors between the colonies and their former imperial rulers
has sometimes served as part of the mechanism that has
triggered coups on both sides of the imperial divide.
But at times there has been a temptation among African
nationalists to overemphasize the external factor behind
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African military coups. Some circles capitulate to the &dquo;scape-
goat complex,&dquo; finding others to blame for failures within
African societies. There is also a school of African thought that
seems to be overwhelmingly based on exogenous determinism,
attributing almost all major events within Africa to external
forces, and virtually denying African peoples the capacity for
independent initiative.
But while some African political analysts have exaggerated
exogenous causes, the fact remains that external factors do
continue to be powerful in both the politics and the economics
of African life. It is such considerations that have created
linkages at times between military factors in the metropolitan
countries and military factors in the former colonies.
But even it it were conceded that the ultimate causes of
military coups in Africa were external in origin, there is no
doubt that the most fundamental consequences of those coups
are domestic. The ascent of soldiers to the commanding heights
of African polities has often resulted in fundamental changes
within those societies. Especially important among these
changes are relations between ethnic groups, relations between
social classes, and relations between African countries and the
wider external world. This last reestablishes links between
societal and extrasocietal factors.
Ethnicity and stratification are fundamental aspects of the
social structure in African conditions. Which of the two forces,
kinship or class, is primary in the African situation? What is
involved is a distinction between the forces of reproduction
and their impact on kinship, and the forces of production and
their impact on social classes. The reproductive forces ema-
nate from concepts of family and the obligations that are
presumed to exist from both marriage and consanguinity.
Filial and parental love, matrimonial loyalties, fraternity, and
the wider circles of kinship are all part of the social implica-
tions of human reproduction, and among the major forces
behind human behavior.
The forces of reproduction lie behind social and political
phenomena ranging from ethnic consciousness to race preju-
dice, from nationalistic assertiveness to ancestor worship.
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When a black man was lynched in the United States for taking
a sexual interest in a white woman, when General Idi Amin
expelled the Asians partly because he thought they were socially
and sexually exclusive, when Hitler asserted a doctrine of
Aryan purity, when the Jews created the State of Israel, when
the British started passing Commonwealth Immigration Acts
and later invented a grandfather clause as a basis for entry into
Britain, when the French looked up to Charles de Gaulle and
thought of him as a father figure symbolizing the nation,
primordial forces of reproduction and their consequences were
at play in varying degrees in all these instances. Even pride in
the history of one’s nation is a form of ancestor worship, a
modernized version of political lineage.
Certainly the temptation in political behavior to use the
symbols of kinship, ranging from concepts of fatherland and
mother tongue to phenomena like cultural nationalism, are all
partly derived from the universe of familial emotions and
loyalties. Certainly patriotism is itself one of the great political
consequences of the forces of reproductive symbolism. These
are aspects of human culture that have developed from
particular aspects of human biology.
Alongside the socialization of reproductive forces is the
other familial factor behind human behavior-economic pro-
duction. Both biology and economics are in part concerned
with human survival. As Marx and Engels reminded human-
ity, man had first to eat before he could build a civilization. The
processes by which man was enabled to eat became the genesis
of economics.
But man had also to reproduce himself in order to survive
beyond a single generation. Marxist analysts, in describing
social and political behavior, have correctly pointed to the
economic factor as part of the primary background to that
behavior. What Marxist analysts have not always adequately
recognized is the equally powerful force of reproductive
symbolism. Out of the economic domain social classes and
class conflict did indeed grow; but equally true is that out of
39
reproductive symbolism other loyalties and antagonisms
emerged, at times much more powerful than economic consid-
erations.
Two factors help to determine which of the two forces,
kinship or class, are more politicized in a given society. These
factors are the scale of the economy and the extent of ethnic
pluralism. In a society that is ethnically homogenous, operat-
ing on the basis of a small economy with simple technology,
ethnicity tends to swing between being politically neutral and
politically reinforcing. It becomes politically reinforcing when
the group as a whole senses a need for reaffirming a shared
ethnic identity. It becomes politically neutral when members
dispute on the basis of other loyalties and interests, including
the class dimension and the narrower unit of the family in
competition with another family within the same broad ethnic
category. Kinship factors are indeed still at play even in
situations where the broader ethnic category is politically
neutralized, but these kinship factors would tend to focus on
subunits.
If the society is not only ethnically homogeneous, but also
produces its means of livelihood on the basis of a small
economy and rudimentary modes of production, the class
factor would again be relatively weak. Even the stratification
system is more likely to be based on symbols of reproduction,
namely heredity and ascription, rather than rational economic
factors. The local notables might indeed be relatively affluent
economically, but the chances are that they add economic
affluence to a prior quality of being relatively well descended.
In many African societies before independence, stratifica-
tion was either very rudimentary or elaborately based on
ethnicity and lineage. People were high or low in the social
structure either directly because they came from a particular
clan or family or indirectly because they had been given
honorary kinship status by such a clan or family.
All social analysis at a broad interpretative level is bound to
distort and oversimplify. This is also true of these generaliza-
tions about precolonial African societies.
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The main point to be grasped is the primacy of reproductive
symbolism in situations of a small-scale economy, rudimentary
technology, and relative ethnic homogeneity.
What happened with colonization and later independence
was both the enlargement of the economic base of African
societies and the pluralization of their ethnic base. Under the
impact of Europe’s economic technology, new trends got under
way in African countries in the direction of greater economic
complexity and scale. And under the impact of the imposed
colonial boundaries, multiple ethnic communities were forced
to share a new national collective identity.
In the face of the enlargement of the economies and the
pluralization of the ethnic composition of the new African
societies, were the symbols of reproduction to decline and give
way to the economic forces of the social classes?
In fact, the forces of reproductive symbolism have not
declined in postcolonial Africa, and have quite often become
more politicized. Yet at the same time new forces of economic
competition and class conflict have also arisen. While pre-
colonial African societies were generally characterized by high
reproductive symbolism and low class conflict, postcolonial
African societies are characterized simultaneously by high
reproductive symbolism and a rising class conflict.
The pluralization of the ethnic base of the new African
society was certainly bound to lead in the direction of
politicizing reproductive symbolism as kinship groups com-
peted with each other for scarce resources. The enlargement
and modernization of African economies have in turn resulted
in the rise of class antagonism.
On the other hand, that very modernization of African
economies and their enlargement should have initiated a
partial erosion of kinship and reproductive loyalties in favor of
more purely economic rivalry. But this has not happened. The
modernization of African economies has not as yet served to
neutralize the heightened sense of ethnic affinity that has come
with ethnic pluralism in the new African nation-states.
In such a situation even the class factor is often defined in
ethnic terms. Members of certain ethnic communities have
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easier access to certain opportunities than members of other
ethnic communities. While in large-scale developed economies
in the northern hemisphere individuals, or at most families,
become members of particular social classes, in Africa there
are times when entire clans, tribes, or subnationalities enter
particular class levels in their societies. The Kikuyu in Kenya in
the colonial period were virtually among the &dquo;untouchables&dquo; of
the colonial society. The people who emptied latrine buckets
and cleaned lavatories in parts of Kenya were disproportion-
ately Kikuyu. By the time of independence, on the other hand,
this whole ethnic category was reclassified by political history
and political realities. Instead of being among the untouch-
ables, the Kikuyu moved up to become relative brahmins.
In reality, just as there are differeht classes within each caste
in India, so there are different levels of advantage and
prosperity within each ethnic community in Africa. The
Kikuyu as a total group have easier access to certain opportu-
nities, especially in the main cities and in government, than
most other ethnic communities. But there are of course poor
Kikuyu as well as rich ones, indigent Kikuyu as well as power-
ful ones. The foreign company in Nairobi or Mombasa that
employs a Kikuyu clerk as an exercise in public relations is, on
the one hand, merely absorbing one more indigent proletarian
into an alien economy, but is also, on the other hand, paying
tribute to the special status of the whole Kikuyu community.
The Buganda during the colonial period in Uganda were
also a privileged group in totality, although within the Buganda
kingdom itself there were peasants as well as aristocrats. The
Amhara in Ethiopia have even more clearly been an ethnic
caste, dominating the country. There were millions of poor and
indigent Amhara, as well as immensely powerful and affluent
Amhara; but the community as a whole was in a fundamental
sense classified as a privileged group within the national
hierarchy.
In such a situation one makes comparisons along occupa-
tional lines. If an Amhara houseboy has a better chance of
improving his status, or obtaining other fringe benefits, than a
Gala houseboy, then clearly in this horizontal comparison
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reproductive status derived from being descended from an
Amhara creates inequalities within the same level of economic
status.
In addition, the distribution of the occupations would also
be decisively influenced by reproductive symbolism. In rela-
tion to population, there would be many more Amhara doctors
and lawyers than Gala doctors and lawyers, many more
prosperous Amhara landowners and businessmen than Gala
landowners and businessmen, many more Amhara bishops
than Gala clerics, and by definition many more Amhara
aristocrats than Gala pretenders to such a status.
In countries like Nigeria and Zaire such allocations of
economic opportunities on the basis of reproductive symbol-
ism were indeed more cdmplicated, but by no means funda-
mentally different. Ethnicity played a decisive role in the events
that led to the Nigerian civil war; and ethnicity has been part of
the tumultuous life of Zaire since it exploded into indepen-
dence in 1960.
The process of national integration in such countries
requires a partial decline in the power of kinship symbolism
and ethnic confrontation, but this decline in itself might first
require the modernization of social conflicts in the direction of
new economic classes. For a while class antagonism and ethnic
antagonism would simply reinforce each other, but as the
economy becomes more complex and its productive capacity
becomes enlarged, kinship competition should begin to sub-
side to some extent, especially as the ethnic pluralism itself
becomes less distinct in the wake of cultural integration and
geographical and biological intermingling among the groups.
In terms of loyalties, for the time being a Kikuyu laborer in
Nairobi is probably a Kikuyu first and a laborer second &dquo;when
the chips are down.&dquo; In identifying his ultimate interests, a
Kikuyu businessman sees his future in the survival of Kikuyu
preeminence in Kenya much more than he sees his future in
terms of a shared destiny with a Luo businessman. Although
both the forces of production and the symbols of reproduction
are exerting a powerful joint influence on the political and
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economic behavior of most African societies, the kinship
factor in its broad meaning continues to have the upper hand.
Only an adequate modernization of the economy could one
day restore balance, reducing the power of ethnicity without
necessarily emasculating it.
Meanwhile, soldiers and civilians have competed for politi-
cal power, and for a role in determining both the economic and
the ethnic future of their countries. By the nature of their
profession, soldiers have aspired to introduce the principle of
discipline as a mechanism for national integration. Civilian
politicians, on the other hand, have aspired to realize the
principle of dialogue as a mechanism for national integration.
In reality, neither the soldiers nor the civilians have lived up to
their professional aspirations. Discipline under military re-
gimes has often been a principle honored more in the breach
than in the observance; dialogue under civilian regimes has
often been a victim of repressive and intolerant authoritarian-
ism. But those very failures, as well as some of the emerging
successes, might well be the resilient manifestations of a
continuing struggle between the symbols of kinship and the
interests of class.
CONCLUSION
We have attempted to demonstrate in this article both the
anguish and the ambitions of an Africa in the process of
moving from modern nationalism to modern nationhood. New
loyalties and horizons have emerged as a result of the colonial
impact. A new consciousness of being black, a new awareness
of belonging to a continent, and a rebellion against subjugation
by others have all played a part in the rise of pan-Africanism
and the consolidation of political consciousness.
Both nationalism and nationhood have strong reproductive
origins. The idea of belonging to the same race or sharing a
fatherland is part of the heritage of the concept of family in
human affairs. The transition from nationalism to nationhood
44
must therefore be regarded as in part a transition from kinship
sentiment to kinship fulfillment, from a desire to see all
Nigerians or all Ugandans as one people to the actual
realization of such a familial concept.
But reproductive symbolism has also its disruptive conse-
quences, as communities that believe themselves to be de-
scended from the same ancestors compete with communities
alleging descent from other ancestors.
While African solidarity was helped by race consciousness
among black people as an affirmation of familial solidarity,
nation-building in individual African countries has been
disrupted by narrower ethnic consciousness and politicized
lineage. Political parties have risen and fallen, governments
have ascended and collapsed, soldiers have commuted between
the barracks and state house-and Africa has struggled each
year to narrow the gap between the depth of its longings and
the fragility of its achievements.
NOTE
1. The translation is borrowed from the Time magazine cover story entitled "A
Book, a Song and then a Revolution" (Time, May 6, 1974).
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